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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of frequent changes of investor protection regulation on the bid 
premium levels and the reception of the bid by the minority shareholders in blockholder regimes. 
In order to document the corporate governance function of takeover regulation, we explore a 
comprehensive data set representing more than 90% of the takeovers organized in Romania 
between 1998 and 2012. The peculiar institutional framework in Romania allows to factor in the 
analysis an hitherto unexplored structural element, namely the parallel control transactions 
managed by the Government, outside the stock market structures. After controlling for the 
influence of corporate governance and ownership attributes of targets, our main findings suggest 
that various market price components are strong predictors of both bid premiums and tender 
success. Besides, the alignment of legal details to the requirements of the European takeover 
regulation has a surprising negative effect on minority claimants. If the shareholders are indeed 
able to distil the pertinent information about a bid, our overall result suggests that the balance 
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between competing concerns of protecting minority shareholders and facilitating value-creating 
transactions is still open to debate in emerging markets.  
JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38 
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1. Introduction
The law and finance literature pioneered by La Porta et al. (1998) claims that the distribution of 
corporate ownership emerges in response to the quality of legal protection of property rights. On 
this ground, the concentrated ownership is an endogenous mechanism that shelters the investor 
rights when the governance standards are poor. However, a two-decade retrospective on the 
experience of transition economies from CEE reveals that ownership of public companies could 
be concentrated by design, from the very first stage of privatization. Reforming governments of 
nineties assigned a major role in corporate restructuring to controlling strategic investors arguing 
the long term stance of their investment strategy and their enhanced ability to overcome 
investment problems in undercapitalized companies. However, irrespective of the endogenous or 
exogenous nature of blockholdings, the received wisdom is that minority shareholders can afford 
little against the value-reducing manoeuvers of controlling shareholder. Thus, limiting 
expropriation has become the primary concern of market authorities in charge with the 
development of the regulatory framework in genuine blockholder regimes.  
Even if there is no infallible way to eliminate the extraction of  private benefits of control in 
concentrated ownership, the interests of minority shareholders can be internalized ex-post in the 
event of a change in control over the company business. The pricing mechanism of corporate 
control transactions, given that acquirers make a bid for all outstanding shares of the offeree 
company at a non discriminatory price, assures that minority shareholders benefit of the premium 
paid for the controlling stake, which includes implicitly the portion of benefits used by the 
incumbent for its private advantage. Because the Mandatory Bid Rule (hereafter MBR) cancels 
any control premium and bans the partial offers for controlling blocks, minority shareholders are 
insulated from coercive bids by their binary tendering decision itself. Shareholder democracy in 
acquisitions renders the bidding price economically relevant when the offeror is able to force 
residual shareholders to sell their shares and gain full control in offeree company. Particularly, the 
European Takeover Directive prescribes that the considerations offered in a previous takeover bid 
that allowed the acquisitions of a stake providing the acquirer with a squeeze-out right are 
presumed to be fair. 

The effectiveness of the takeover regulation as corporate governance mechanism was taken for 
granted in all the European emerging markets. Under the pressure of legal harmonization, the 
equal opportunity rule and fairness concerns have been restated in the national market laws and 
the corporate governance codes of stock markets. One of the main conclusions of the Takeover 
Bids Directive Assessment Report prepared in 2012 for the European Commission shows that 
investors’ community believes that MBR has a strong positive impact on the protection of 
minority shareholders in concentrated ownership. Nevertheless, Goergen et al. (2005) consider 
that benchmarking the value of squeeze-out right against the takeover price is likely to decrease 
the overall consideration and consequently the bidding premium. Besides, the academic 
contributions of  Comment and Schwert (1995), Rossi and Volpin (2004), Anderson et al. (2009), 
Marshall and Anderson (2009), Alexandris et al. (2010), and Croci and Petmezas (2010) found 
that targets enjoying strong protection environments are able to extract higher takeover premiums 
than those facing poor governance standards. Such a new insight makes us conjecture that despite 
the harmonization of certain rules and regulatory convergence, the success of a recipe for an 
effective investor protection does not depend only on the dose of each ingredient but also on the 
sequence in which those ingredients are processed. 
The Romanian market for corporate control is well suited to the assessment of the effectiveness 
of takeover regulation, in view of its main objectives, at least for two reasons. First, it allows to 
test whether the flexibility provided to the national financial authority to use some exceptions and 
derogations from the general principles affects the interests of minority shareholders. Even if the 
bid for a control position is mandatory from the very market inception, the national regulation 
exempts the offerors from this legal obligation in case of privatization of a listed company. The 
interference of Government in the chronology of control transactions concluded among private 
investors casts an entirely different light on some flagship legal measures leveling the playing 
field, like ownership transparency provisions
1
, mandatory bid rule and squeeze-out rule. The 
structure of the bids completed on the Romanian market for corporate control reveals that 
acquirers and controlling shareholders of targets have rarely been distinctive entities and that 
many of them previously bought the majority block directly from the Government, outside the 

 Information related to share and control structures are addresses mainly by the Transparency Directive (pre-bid 
general disclosure) 

market structures. Under such circumstances, the disclosure requirement of the ownership 
positions, even if triggered at the traditional levels of 5% or 10% of voting rights, looses 
practically its main functions as exclusionary mechanism, namely disseminating information 
about the likely targets and timing when the valuation of prospective bidders is revealed to the 
market2. Besides, the takeover law accommodates the Government's interest in the detriment of 
the other categories of shareholders. Thus, an investor who buys within privatization even a 
minority block that added to his previous holdings makes him exceed the controlling threshold 
may get around the MBR. Practically, the minority shareholders are not entitled to participate in 
any sale transaction involving Government holdings. Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) treat these 
peculiar block trades, suggestively called in the market law "excepted transactions", as a 
manifestation of poor governance in Romania. This way of securing control in public companies 
provided the dominant shareholders a large information advantage over external investors and an 
opportunity to exploit the inefficiencies caused by the low free float. Pop (2006) finds that 
minority shareholders cannot appropriate any fraction of the takeover surplus, especially when 
the target is already controlled by a major shareholder who previously traded a block with the 
privatization authority (hereafter AVAS). Sometimes those direct deals involved blocks providing 
more than 90% of voting rights, increasing thus the probability that a controlling shareholder 
would later take the company private often without performing any previous market transaction 
(Chemla et al., 2010). Second, the focus on the individual experience of the Romanian market 
helps quantifying not only the effects of takeover law but also the contribution of other legal 
provisions not necessarily covered by the Directive to the scope of minority shareholders 
protection during different periods of regulation. Atanasov et al. (2007) underline that 
interactions among legal provisions, on one hand, and among provisions and institutions, on the 
other hand, have different dilutive consequences on minority shareholders. Particularly, the 
frequent changes of legal details concerning the mandatory bid thresholds, the minimum bidding 
price condition, the benchmarks used for establishing delisting terms, the restrictions placed on 
acquirers’ actions corroborated with anti-dilutive statutes and preemptive rights allow us 
endorsing the dynamics of legal design into the broader institutional framework of a country 

2
 Once the market identifies the prospective bidders, they can no longer buy any share of the target at a price lower 
than the post-acquisition value of the share (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 

belonging to the legal family providing the weakest investor protection according to LLSV 
(1998).  
In order to address this research question, we conduct an empirical analysis on the size of 
takeover premiums and bid outcomes, which covers the entire takeover contest involving the 
Romanian public companies between 1998 and 2012. In order to get a complete picture of the 
bidding process we include all the transactions approved by the Romanian Stock Exchange 
Commission (hereafter CNVM), whatever the initial ownership of acquirers. We explicitly take 
into account the importance of other alternative mechanisms allowing the offerors to lessen the 
burden of the mandatory bid requirement, like privatization deals or standard capital increases.  
The privatization process is a key governance issue because it affects the dynamics of ownership 
and the organization of corporate structures. However, due to its very nature, such a dimension is 
country-specific and cannot be extrapolated to the international context. In Romania, despite an 
ample mass privatization program,3 which was followed by a broad representation of the partially 
privatized companies on the stock market, the selling process of Government’s blocks had been 
carried out over more than twenty years. Those transactions, concluded outside the bounds of the 
stock exchange, have increased the availability of ownership per se making the appetite of novel 
riders and empire builders easier to satisfy. Besides the opportunity provided to investors to 
structure creeping acquisitions, and their obvious impact on the control contestability in the 
privatized companies, such parallel control transactions, in aggregate, could have had an in-play 
effect on the pricing of blockholdings. The prospective bidders, even if not involved in the 
competitive auctions or the direct negotiations organized by AVAS, observe the privatization 
outcome, which is public information. The privatization price plays a yardstick role in anchoring 
the value of control and thus affects the propensity of acquirers to overpay in M&A when blocks 
in so many other companies are available. Consequently, this privatization price component 
should be observable in the takeover premium paid in acquisitions concluded under the scrutiny 
of the market. While privatization routinely delivers a basis for the control price, the size of 

 In 1995, the Romanian Government decided to transfer to citizens for free either 40% or 60% of the share capital in 
almost 6.000 companies. Nevertheless, at the end of the subscription period many of those blocks were only partially 
privatized and were included back into the Government portfolio.    

contemporaneous privatization premiums or discounts in other public companies should not 
affect the reception of the bid by the target shareholders and thus their tendering decision. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no other previous study addressing the interactions between the 
pricing of those two complementary control transactions types. 
Faccio and Stolin (2006), Atanasov et al. (2010) argue that the scope of expropriation has 
investment implications inducing an ex-ante pricing adjustment that depresses the value at which 
the minority stakes are bought in the first place. Thus, controller's opportunistic behavior is 
already factored into the valuation of public companies and the size of expected returns. A market 
pricing mechanism that already includes the information about prospective dilution alters the 
baseline for the tender offers, too. Under such circumstances, the compensation offered to 
minority shareholders would help preserving the allocational efficiency, unless the acquirer can 
reap a benefit by offering systematically lower takeover premiums. We check this question 
empirically by exploring a novel determinant of takeover premiums and tender success that 
control for effective dilution via equity changes. Even if from a legal perspective, capital 
increases with preferential subscription rights cannot be used to avoid the application of the 
MBR
4 such strategies could influence the way the control is exercised in listed companies and 
consequently the propensity of minority shareholders to accept less favorable terms in a 
subsequent takeover bid. An obvious concern in this area is that financial tunneling is a perverse 
expropriation mechanism that precedes and facilitates freeze-outs.  
As in Betton and Eckbo (2000) and Bates et al. (2006), we expect to learn about the bidding 
strategy from initial deal attributes, as well as from revised terms. Bid revisions give insights on 
the competition for the control rights by third-party bidders (Betton and Eckbo, 2000) or the 
balance of power between minority and major shareholders, especially in freeze-outs via tender 
offers (Bates et al., 2006). However, our contention is that the type of revision conveys different 
information about the exposure of minority shareholders to self-serving offers by bidders. After 
controlling for the rival bids, the bid jumps are consistent with greater bargaining power of 
minority shareholders who are able to extract from acquirers a larger portion of the deal surplus, 

 In Romania, a controlling shareholder who is not willing to initiate a takeover bid must dispose of the shares 
exceeding the threshold triggering a MBR within 3 months (also applicable to mergers or divisions). 

even in the absence of explicit negotiations. On the contrary, extending the bid period without 
adjusting the bid price is likely to signal a conflict inherent to entrenched ownership structures. 
Remaining shareholders are unwilling to exit at the bidding price but in reality they cannot 
influence the structure of the offer.  
This paper provides evidence on the pattern of open market transactions and block trades such as 
purchases, sales and net purchases, made by insiders with target shares before takeover 
announcement for a sub-sample of acquisitions announced between 2006 and 2012. Two 
competing, but not necessarily exclusive, hypotheses state that the price run-up in the target 
shares before acquisitions is driven both by the market that anticipates an impending takeover bid 
and insiders trading on private information about target.
5
 The acquirers and the persons acting in 
concert with them should have an interest in building short-term toeholds in the target (Betton et 
	#  ( % et al., 2014). The observed trades provide arbitrage opportunities to other 
institutional and individual investors who update the stand alone value of the target compelling 
bidders to offer higher initial bidding prices and affecting the deal outcome (Heish and Walkling, 
2005).6 However, the strategy of purchasing short-term toeholds can be costly to the bidder by 
driving up the market price. The 52-week high price is a common reference across target 
	#')$*	'+ (,	*	#- ((,	#- (.	#'		
considerable effect on the bidding price and the willingness of target shareholders to embrace the 
offer. According to the takeover law, if the historical highest price was actually paid by the 
acquirer, it becomes an explicit fair price benchmark and can be hardly used as an appeal to 
tendering. Such a benchmarking imposed by regulation could provide a novel explanation to the 
substitution effect between the runup and the markup, which is specific to regulated markets for 
corporate control.
7
  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data selection 
procedure while the section 3 presents the explanatory variables and testable hypothesis. The 

5
 Jabbour et al. (2000), exploits such detailed information on the Canadian takeover market and found that insider 
trading intensifies during the two months preceding the acquisition doubling the abnormal returns observed on days 
with no insider trading. 
6
 A comprehensive study on the gain of insiders on roundtrip trades and the enforcement mechanisms against this 
activity is beyond the scope of this article. 
7
 Betton et al (2013) finds a substitution effect on the US market for corporate control, where there is no mandatory 
rule or bid price restrictions.

implications of empirical results are discussed in section 4. The final section provides our 
conclusion.  
2. Data and sample selection 
Our initial sample includes all the takeover bids approved by the CNVM between 1
st
 of January 
1998 and 31
st 
of December 2012. As no standard database exists, we collect information on 1,945 
transactions by confronting several sources of information: (1) CNVM takeover lists and weekly 
"	# /## )(. ,"	 $"* 0
"	 )	 ,$0. #"" '		 ).  1
'		/	  $-$-2-!- 3042550 ). Bursa newspaper that publishes a large number of 
takeover public announcements. For a given bid we compile data from those sources
8
 about the 
).&647	%%	#'	)(./''8')./			/9"/').
final bidding %")./'	)."#'	):.%"	');./''%'
	')<./''		').	#1%/''-=
"#'
from the analysis the buyback offers, the clean-up transactions organized after 2005 and formally 
identified as such by the CNVM and the bids made for targets from the financial sector.  
We define the initial and final takeover premium by scaling the initial and final offer price, 
respectively, by the target stock closing price 35 days prior to the reference date.
9
 The reference 
date is the day the CNVM approves the takeover.10 The market prices were sourced from the 
S.S.I.F. ROMINTRADE.  
  
The tender offer outcome is the percentage of shares tendered within the bid with respect to the 
number of shares that the bidder wants to acquire according to the tender offer document. An 

8
 None of our sources of information covers completely the takeover contests. For example, the weekly bulletins of 
CNVM (comprising all the decisions made by CNVM) are available beginning with 2003, the BVB electronic 
summary includes the bids made after 2005, while the BVB repository is used on a regular basis for filling the 
closing reports after 2006 and the full takeover documents especially after 2011. 
9
 As the historical bid-ask spreads are not available, missing transaction prices are replaced by the previous closing 
price.
10
 Replacing the CNVM approval date with the first of the two following dates: (1) the date of the preliminary 
announcement of a bid (2) the date the market trades with the target shares are suspended by the CNVM, does not 
change the results.  

offer succeeds if, according to the closing report, at least one share is tendered by the target 
shareholders and purchased by the bidder while it fails if no share is tendered. 
Of all transactions we are able to compute the takeover premium for 1,730 deals and the takeover 
success for 1,814 deals. If there is no information about the bid closing or no market transaction 
involving the target shares before the approval date those observations were dropped from the 
final samples. These final samples, described in Table 1, represent about 90% of all bids made 
over the analyzed period.  
{Insert Table 1 about here} 
Table 2 reports means, standard deviations and quartiles for the takeover premium and bid 
success on the whole samples and classified by year. The peak values of takeover premiums are 
winsorized at 95% levels. As revealed by the mean takeover premium of 124% and the median of 
27.7% wide variation remains. A quarter of the bids was initially made at a discount with respect 
to the market price and was amended till closing by a tiny 1% positive premium. When grouped 
by year, the summary statistics shows that takeover premiums varied a lot and, on the average, 
the highest compensation was offered in 2004, a year when some important changes were made 
to the takeover regulation. Afterwards the takeover premium began to decline to 6.5% in 2012. 
However, the tender success had been decreasing over the analyzed period, a trend that becomes 
obvious when expressed in median values. 
{Insert Table 2 about here} 
In order to better discern the takeover outcomes we match the approval date of each bid with one 
of the regulatory regimes governing takeovers and stock market transactions in Romania. We 
identify ten different regulatory regimes based on the details regarding the conditions under 
which the controlling stake can be acquired, a public company can be delisted, and the main 
aspects defining the anti-dilutive statute namely, preemptive rights, minimum issue price, and 
shareholder approval rights. 

Regulatory regime 1. According to the initial takeover rules, any bidder who wanted to acquire 
the majority stake (50%) in a public company should make an offer for all outstanding shares at a 
uniform price. However, there is no special minimum price condition and the circumstances 
justifying a delisting decision concerned size and liquidity issues of the target.
11
 Besides, the 
offeror aiming to acquire a controlling position (33%) without exceeding the majority position 
(50%) was allowed to make a partial bid and to allocate pro-rata the tendered shares in the case 
the offer was oversubscribed. Compared with all the other legal regimes, the takeover regulation 
before mid of 2002 is the most permissive one. Almost 50% of the bids took place in that regime.  
Regulatory regime 2. In April 2002, a more comprehensive securities regulation defines for the 
first time a going private transaction with respect to the 90% threshold of the total voting rights 
and sets restrictions on the rival bids (size of the rival bid, price auction, unique closing date for 
all rival bids) and acquirer actions (no subsequent offer within 12 months after the bid closing). 
The regulation puts in place multiple threshold crossing triggers restricting increases in 
ownership over 75% of the voting rights without making a takeover bid. Without providing any 
particular justification, the new regulation states that the acquisition of control following a deal 
with AVAS or the purchasing of securities from the Ministry of Public Finance during the process 
of enforcing the receivables held by the State budget fall within the scope of exemptions. During 
this regulatory regime, the General Assembly of Shareholders of listed companies could not 
cancel the preemptive rights of their shareholders.  
Regulatory regime 3. Several months later, a new market law settles the previous rules applicable 
to the mandatory bids but makes some changes of the standards concerning the buyout price. 
According to this regulation, the controlling shareholder with more than 90% of outstanding 
shares has the obligation to buyout the minority holdings. Besides, it is recognized for the first 
time that the minority shareholders owning at least 5% of the share capital have the right to 
contest the buyout price. Another important change made during the third regime concerns a 
larger scope of in-kind contributions. Particularly, the investors having assumed explicit 
contractual obligations during the privatization managed par AVAS can increase unilaterally their 

A company could be delisted if after the bid closing, the target had less than 500 shareholders or its share capital 
was lower than 1 billion ROL. 

ownership in a public company by capitalizing their investments consented in the privatization 
contracts.  
Regulatory regimes 4, 5 and 6. In less than a year, new regulations addressed the thorny question 
of the fair price standards in the special case of delisting and the way of dealing with the conflicts 
between the acquirer controlling the target and its minority shareholders. CNVM enacted 
alternative valuation rules, e.g. appraisal based on fundamental values, market based valuation or 
valuation based on the previous purchases by the acquirer and various combinations of these 
benchmarks, e.g. a single value, the average or the maximum among two or three price criteria. 
Beginning with the sixth regime, the shareholders owning at least 75% of the targeted shares 
could contest the bidding price within the 10 days after the announcement date (at least 30 days 
before the biding period) and hire a second expert to assess a new price. 
Regulatory regime 7. The takeover regulation from 2003 imposed for the first time a minimum 
price condition in the case of the mandatory bid rule for 50% of the voting rights. Thus, the 
minimum price is the highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror, or any person 
acting in concert with him, over the 12 months preceding the bid. It adjusts once more the 
benchmark for buyout price.  
Regulatory regime 8. Following the prescriptions of the European Takeover Directive, the 
Market Law of 2004 modifies the MBR trigger from 50% to 33%, reducing the scope of partial 
offers. The regulation makes no longer any reference to intermediate thresholds of 50% or 75% 
of voting rights. A minimum price criterion (meanwhile slightly changed) is maintained for the 
acquisition of a controlling block. It also states that the bidding price paid in a previous 
mandatory bid or voluntary bid when at least 90% of the targeted shares were tendered, taken that 
the offeror makes use of its squeeze-out right within the 3 months following the closing of the 
previous takeover bid, is a fair buyout price. Minority shareholders receive an explicit sell-out 
right, if a controlling shareholder owns at least 95% of the voting rights. One new important legal 
detail related to the balance of power between large and small shareholders, which falls outside 
the bounds of takeover regulation, is the possibility to cancel the preemptive rights of 

shareholders when shareholders owning 75% of the voting rights vote in favor of such a measure 
at the extraordinary shareholders' meeting.  
Regulatory regimes 9 and 10. The last two regulatory regimes restate the fair price standard in 
the case of squeeze out offers, as advised in the European Takeover Directive, but change the 
computation method of the minimum bidding price when the acquirers bought no shares of the 
target in the period preceding the bid. If no acquisition by the offeror took place in the previous 
12 months, the price must be at least equal to the value of the net asset per share according to the 
last financial statement of the issuer. Starting with July 2005, a new sale-out procedure forces the 
minority shareholders to sell their shares to a major shareholder using his squeeze-out right. 
Finally, during those periods the Board of Directors of public companies receive more leeway 
when the shareholders of a public company do not use their preemptive rights and an equity issue 
remains undersubscribed. The main differences among those two regimes concern the rule 
employed to calculate the minimum bidding price for voluntary bids and the criteria applied 
when preemptive rights are canceled.  
All in all, the nexus of regulations altering the positions of securities holders, deterring or 
speeding transactions are crucial for the assessment of the MBR and reveals the controversy 
surrounding the efficiency and fairness issues in control transactions. A mapping of those regimes 
is presented in Appendix 1, while descriptive statistics of the main dependent variables by regime 
are presented in Table 3. 
{Insert Table 3 about here} 
3. Explanatory variables and testable hypotheses 
The next step consists of the identification of various aspects of the targets' corporate governance 
structure, bidder and deal characteristics that are likely to influence the acquisition premium and 
bid outcome. Descriptive statistics on those variables across categories of their major 
determinants is listed in Table 4.  

Privatization premium benchmarks 
In order to investigate the link between the gradual decrease of Government ownership and 
takeover market involving exclusively private investors, we exploit the AVAS reports containing 
all negotiated deals. From a total of 11,034 transactions, we identify for 3,873 deals concerning 
listed companies and performed during their stock market episode the following information: (1) 
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those attributes we determine the privatization price per share and then the privatization premium 
by comparing the negotiated price with the market price available 35 days before the 
privatization date. The pricing benchmark for each takeover is computed as the moving average 
of the privatization premiums clustered by industry over 52 weeks preceding t-14 days, where “t” 
is the date CNVM approved the takeover bid.  We control the radial influence of privatization 
over the period 1998-2004, because the process of ownership transfer from State to private 
investors began to lose intensity, at least when addressed by industrial sector.  
H1: If bidders give any weight to historical privatization prices, we expect finding a positive 
relationship between the acquisition premium and the average privatization premium paid within 
the industry of the target. 
Equity changes and financial dilution 
For each target included in our analysis we check first whether there is any change of the share 
capital reported by BSE and collect the main information available on the (1) date of equity 
"	 )(./	'	/	'	 >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before and after the equity event. Then, for each equity change performed before the bid date, we 
manually search information on their individual effect and the ex-post ownership structure in the 
news database of S.S.I.F. TRADEVILLE and BSE.
12
 At the bid date, from 1,096 unique targets, 

12
 After 2005, a more detailed description of the type of equity changes becomes available also in the official reports 
of BSE. Besides, if there is no announcement about the ownership structure on the TRADEVILLE platform, we 
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674 changed their share capital at least once, which means that 56% of takeover bids were 
preceded by 1,025 equity operations. Based on the description of equity event, we compound the 
degree of equity dilution inflicted to minority shareholders in function of the free float after the 
equity change and the reported effect. When the equity change consists of modifying the face 
value or represents a right offering, as well as a stock dividend distribution, there is a 
homogeneous effect of those operations on all shareholders of the issuing company. In such 
cases, the dilution is normalized to zero. However, when one of the target shareholder is 
explicitly identified in the announcement as being exclusively affected by the operation, usually 
the major shareholder or AVAS, or the description of the event point out to a capitalization of the 
investments consented into the privatization contract signed with AVAS, minority shareholders 
suffer a complete dilution of their rights, which depends on the size of the equity change.
13
 Thus, 
the financial dilution per equity change is computed as the ratio of (1) the difference between the 
ex-post free float and ex-ante free float divided by (2) the ex-ante free float. We recognize that 
the dilution consequences are more severe when the target is involved in several changes of 
equity capital, by compounding the dilution measure over all equity issues reported before the bid 
date.  
H2: If the acquirer seeks to enjoy the control at the minority shareholders expense, we expect that 
the higher the dilution, the lower the takeover premium and the higher the tender success.  
Toehold 
The toehold is the size of pre-offer ownership of acquirer, expressed in percentage with respect to 
the outstanding shares of target. Buying an initial capital before the takeover bid, ideally without 
arousing the market suspicion, is central to the bidding strategies. The toehold bidding is 
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check whether such information is announced on the BSE fillings within one-week following the equity date. 
13 
If the announcement before the equity issue indicates a cum-right date for all shareholders while there is no 
available information on the beneficial owners, we ignore the partial dilution of minority shareholders arising when 
those participating in the equity offering have an "oversubscription privilege". Detailed reports about the number of 
shares subscribed and canceled with respect to the number of shares issued in exchange for cash needed for restoring 
the position of minority shareholders, are available only for the second half of the analyzed period. Atanasov et al. 
(2007) underline that the lack of participation of minority shareholders, even if the dilution rises, cannot be imputed 
to the major shareholder. The minority shareholders prefer not exercising their preemptive right if they anticipate 
being frozen-out at large discounts.  
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beneficial because it reduces the amount paid for the remaining shares and provides a competitive 
advantage over the rival offers. Betton et al. (2007) show that there is a decreasing trend in the 
level of toeholds of acquirers in US targets and despite the theoretical arguments in favor of 
positive toeholds those ones are rare in mature markets.
14
 In our sample, from 1,696 bids for 
which we were able to collect information on toehold, only 20% of the bidders do not have a 
toehold. In order to control for the non-linearity of the bidder's ownership, we partition our 
sample across toehold categories. Conditional on positive toeholds, we include indicator variables 
equal to one whenever the bidder toehold falls within the following four ranges: 0% < toehold < 
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a "novel control" dummy variable, by breaking down the direct toehold with respect to the legal 
control definition, namely 50% (regulatory regimes 1 to 7) and 33% (regulatory regimes 8 to 10). 
We consider that an acquirer holds a novel controlling position if he crosses the minimum legal 
stakes after the closing of the bid. 
AVAS foothold 
The targets included in our analysis were involved in 1,908 privatization transactions before the 
bid date, 402 deals being made with the bidders. In 208 cases the bidder bought a majority 
foothold from AVAS. The long-term toehold is viewed as an entrenching dimension of 
governance at target level. Its influence is controlled in our analysis by identifying the bids 
proffered by investors that had previously dealt a block directly with AVAS. 
Short-term toehold 
By the end of 2004, BSE created a publicly available electronic repository allowing the issuers to 
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hand-collected all the reported daily insider transactions for the subsample of acquisitions 
announced between 2006 and 2012. Thus, after the enforcement of this new disclosure 

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The reader can refer to Betton et al. (2008) for a comprehensive review of the literature on corporate takeovers.  
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requirement we sampled manually over 8,000 transactions reported by insiders of target firms 
and we identified 1,697 transactions that took place during the year preceding the bid date.  
Based on those reports, we construct a short-term toehold proxy capturing the percentage of 
target shares amassed directly on the market or via share block trades15 during the 52 weeks 
before the bid.
16
 The accumulation of target shares ahead the takeover announcement creates an 
explicit cost for the insiders if they must or decide to pursue the increase in the ownership with a 
subsequent bid for all outstanding shares. Such a cost is due to the legal obligation to establish a 
biding price at least equal to the maximum price paid for purchasing the target shares during the 
12 months ahead the bid. Under the pressure of legal constraints, the acquirers would have the 
interest to reduce purchases before the announcement, even to increase sales that not make them 
fall under certain thresholds. Besides, the insiders who had involuntarily increased their stakes in 
the targets after an equity increase could decide to sell the extra-number of shares. If such, the 
acquirers should be net sellers instead of net buyers and the strategy of stock price manipulation 
more likely in the case of controlling shareholders.17 However, the rationale of this disclosure 
standard is to avoid the transfer of the control block from another insider or from the controlling 
shareholder to a new investor at a premium over the price for remaining shareholdings. When the 
ownership distribution is rearranged by explicit dealing before an open bid, we should observe a 
net buying position for the acquirer and a net selling position for the other insiders.  
The effect of the transactions made by insiders on the initial acquisition premium is apprehended 
by the following variables: (1) the short-term direct toehold calculated as the net purchase made 
/	">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which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the total selling is higher than the volume 
%"	' / '   	  /'' ).  52-week High bidder paid, a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the highest market price over the 52 weeks preceding the 
bid is equal to the highest price paid by the acquirer over the same period. 
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 Toeholds smaller than the threshold requiring a substantial shareholder notice can not be captured in our analysis. 
16 
In the %"	#''"#'%"	),	#-( Aspris et al. 2014), the 
"short-term" period ranges from 30 to 42 days, which corresponds to the run-up period analyzed in those studies.  
17 
The surplus over the controlling stake (33% after 2004) is a buffer for manipulating the market price. However, 
such a strategy should not create a "false market" in the securities of target. 
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In all cases, we perform the same analyses by replacing the direct toehold with the indirect 
toehold, which takes into account the ownership of the persons acting in concert with the 
acquirer. The takeover literature reveals that one expects a negative influence of toeholds on the 
takeover premium. However, because of their high frequency, the large direct and indirect 
toeholds are noisy and cannot be decoupled from the identity of acquirers.  We take into account 
the heterogeneity of expropriation technologies across shareholders by constructing 8 categories 
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H3: The higher the direct or indirect toehold, the lower the acquisition premium and the lower the 
tender success. 
Rival offers and bid revisions 
According to Fishman (1988), if the control is priced strategically, the targets attracting rival 
offers should receive a lower initial premium that those paid by uncontested bidders. This insight 
is questioned by Betton et al. (2013) who found that, when a rival bid decides to compete, the 
initial offer premium plays no deterring role. However, under the pressure of competition, the 
bidders adjust more aggressively the final price or extend the acceptance period leaving 
considerable leeway to target shareholders to opt for one of the bids. We define a rival offer as a 
tender offer that begins before the closing of a previous bid for the same target. Price revision is 
the ratio of the final and initial acquisition price, respectively, while the acceptance period 
revision is an indicator variable equal to one if the bidder modified the initial closing date. 
Approximately 9% of the bids are contested, a price auction sequence is recorded in more than 
17% of the bids, while the acceptance bid period was extended in 21% of individual bid 
observations. The higher frequency of bid revisions challenges the presumption of passivity of 
minority shareholders in some targets, even if no rival arrives. 

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 Those companies are the former five private privatization funds founded by political decision in 1993.
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H4: Contested bids are completed at higher acquisition premium but the overall success is lower. 
H5: The bid revisions have a positive impact on the tender success. 
The introduction of formal corporate governance and transparency requirements, the updating of 
the takeover regulation to new standards, are deemed to improve the bargaining position of 
minority shareholders. If this conjecture already attested for European markets (Rossi and Volpin, 
( '  	#-  (<. 	'   61 C	#	' )7		## 	' '  (<.  
generally true, the following hypothesis should be validated: 
H6: The more stringent the takeover regulation, the higher the tender premiums and bid success. 
Appendix 2 summarizes these definitions and the measurement of all variables. Several well-
documented determinants of takeover premiums, like the payment method and the hostility of the 
bid are irrelevant in our context. All takeovers are cash-bids and opposed bids are anecdotal. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Bivariate analysis 
In Table 4, we examine the acquisition characteristics by splitting observations in two groups 
based on the size of different explanatory variables.  
{Insert Table 4 about here} 
First we check whether there is any significant difference between the takeovers made by bidders 
with no prior ownership in the targets and those made by one of the target's shareholders (Table 
4.a.). On average, the new acquirers pay an initial premium of 148.7%, which is significantly 
higher than 120.0% offered by bidders that take prior ownership positions in their targets. The 
same significant relationship holds for the average final premiums, as well as for the bid 
outcomes. Conditional on positive toeholds, the initial and final premium are significantly higher, 

on average, when the bidder already owns the majority but the difference is insignificant when 
median values are considered instead (Table 4.b.). When we breakdown the direct toehold  with 
respect to the legal control definition, we find that novel controlling shareholders pay finally as 
much as pre-existing controlling shareholders, even if, on average, their initial proposition was 
lower than the premium offered by controlling shareholders of targets (Table 4.c.).   
We also construct a sub-sample of 324 bids where the ownership of bidders exceeds 90% but the 
transaction is not reported as a clean-up transaction. The initial and final premiums for those 
transactions are compared with those paid in takeovers, which, if some criteria are met after the 
closing, provide the acquirer with the right to buyout all remaining shares at the same price. The 
bivariate results showed in Table 4.d., "Toehold B 90%" vs. "Squeeze-out" show that minority 
shareholders receive a higher premium in standard bids than in forced stock sales. The mean 
difference is 179.7% and is strongly significant at 1% level. This result raises the issue of whether 
the potential acquirers strategically shape their bidding strategy to the legal constraints addressing 
delisting, by systematically lowering the takeover premium in previous stages, likely to get them 
over the threshold of 90% of outstanding shares.   
In increased-in-ownership M&A type, a term coined by Croci and Petmezas (2010), the 
controlling shareholder could previously acquire a block by trading directly with AVAS. If the 
sole motivation behind the decision of crossing the 50% threshold had been the extraction of 
private benefits of control at the minority shareholders expense, those investors would had never 
chosen to make any subsequent voluntary bid.
19
 We construct two groups, majority vs. minority 
foothold (Table 4.f.), based on the maximum block sold by AVAS in all the privatization rounds 
organized before the bid date. Controlling shareholders possessing the majority foothold make 
higher offers than non-controlling bidders that had previously bought AVAS minority blocks 
(214.3% compared to 169.4%). Such a result makes us infer that the market price could adjust in 
response to such changes in ownership structures. Indeed, negotiations of a minority block 
facilitates takeover target prediction, while a further increase in the ownership over the threshold 
fully empowering the shareholder is more likely to come as a surprise.  

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 As the MBR is not triggered after a privatization transaction, even if the legal threshold is reached, a bid for the 
remaining shares is up to the controlling shareholder. 
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Bearing in mind the magnitude of the privatization phenomenon, we refine the analysis of the 
impact of the major shareholdings built-up by circumventing the stock market on the scope of 
shareholder protection by comparing the premium paid for the targets already controlled by the 
bidders to those offered for targets dominated by other insiders who dealt with AVAS. The 
bivariate results reported in Table 4.g. show that even if the controlling bidders pay a 
significantly higher premium (232.2%), the minority shareholders accept more largely the 
bidding terms in targets controlled by other dominant shareholders (34.2% vs. 28.6%, on 
average). As a majority owner cannot be removed without being compensated for the loss of 
private benefits, such a result raises the question of the rationale behind a takeover initiated by a 
third-party acquirer at less favorable relative terms. If we suppose that higher governance 
standards lead to lower private benefits of control, an incumbent owner should sell out and 
consequently the tender success should exceed 50% in those cases. As it does not seem to be the 
case, the tender decision of minority shareholders in targets dominated by large shareholders, 
others then bidders, provides support to the pre-emptive theory of Högfeldt and Högholm (2000). 
The minority shareholders facilitate the emergence of a pivotal shareholder because the implicit 
threat of blocking a future delisting drives up the premium in full-acquisitions. Besides, the 
higher premiums received by target shareholders from controlling bidders, which would have 
been able to quietly consummate their prerequisites after buying the majority stake from AVAS,
20
could signal an increase in the shared benefits of control due to unexpected good performance 
and a fostered interest in delisting the target.
21
The targets attracting competition receive, on average, a premium of 157.0%, significantly higher 
than that offered in single bids. The significant difference between the two means (Table 4.i.) 
questions the preemption argument of Fishman (1988), given that the bid is contested at least 
once. Bearing in mind that, according to the regulation, the minimum tender offer is of 
approximately 3 calendar weeks and no tender offer is valid without the CNVM approval, a quick 
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Burkart et al. (1998) show that acquirers would never voluntarily choose to exceed the minimum control threshold 
because at this level the extraction of private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders is maximum.
21
 Croci and Del Giudice (2012) found that compared with the effects of other public to private transactions, the 
abnormal returns are lower in the case of buyouts made by controlling shareholders but they do not explicitly check 
whether the raw compensation offered to minority shareholders is adequate. A large stream of the literature considers 
delisting carried out in strong corporate governance environments as being a manifestation of the good protection of 
minority shareholders (see also Thomson et al., 2013). 
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arrival of a new bid could signal that competing bidders had already performed their private 
valuations of the target when the first offer was launched. The magnitude of bid revision when at 
least two bidders compete for the target almost double compared to initial terms (299.0%) and is 
significantly higher than the final bid premium (169.2%) offered by uncontested bidders. The 
competition on the market for corporate control affects negatively the reception of the contested 
bids.  
The bivariate analysis of the initial takeover premium contrasting strategies with no price revision 
(Table 4.j.) to those when the bidding price was raised till completion is in line with the empirical 
findings of Betton and Eckbo (2000), Betton et al. (2007). The offer premium in tender offers 
completed without amending the price (128.8%) is significantly higher, on average, than the first 
premium in a sequence of revised pricing terms (100.5%). Moreover, the significant jump 
between the first bid and the final bid of 258.4% improves significantly the reception of the 
tender offer by the remaining shareholders. On average, the tender success increases from 34.3% 
for an offer completed at the price mentioned in the initial takeover document to 49.4% when the 
bid is amended. 
When we perform the same analysis with respect to the takeover period revision (Table 4.k.), the 
tests of mean and median differences show that the acquirers who decide to extend the tender 
validity period in reaction to a low supply of shares pay initially a significantly lower premium 
than those who close the offer on time. However, when the acquirer decides also to increase the 
bidding price after the bid initiation, a longer tender period is associated with a higher price 
revision according to the median values (63.9% vs. 38.89%). Nevertheless, a tender offer that 
remains open for a longer period does no not attract more minority shareholdings, 38.0% on 
average which is not statistically different from 36.1% tendered during the standard acceptance 
period. 
Finally, we separately examine acquisitions for the targets that were not involved in any equity 
operations and those that experienced such changes (Table 4.l.). As an equity change provides 
opportunities to realize wealth transfers from minority shareholders, belonging to the last group 
could be consistent with financial expropriation. The shareholders that were more likely to have 
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wealth tunneled away from them receive, on average, a final premium of 158.5%. The high level 
of absolute acquisition premium does necessarily point to a "bad" acquisition but, compared to 
that offered to the targets not suspected of financial maneuvers, it is significantly lower at 1% 
level. Besides, this corporate governance attribute impacts significantly the offer success. 
4.2 Regression analysis 
In order to further examine the initial insights provided by the bivariate analysis, we explore the 
relationship between the acquisition premium and the selected determinants in several 
multivariate settings. The general form of the regression models are as follows: 
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As our measures of the (initial and final) acquisition premium exhibit large variations, especially 
at the upper tail of the distributions, we control for outliers in several alternative ways. First, we 
winsorize the acquisition premiums at the 95% level. Second, we exclude all the observations 
higher than the 95th percentile of the distribution of the acquisition premium. Third, we use a 
robust estimation technique based on iteratively reweighted least squares, which assigns lower 
weights to observations with large residuals, making the estimation less sensitive to outliers. 
Standard errors are calculated using the pseudo-values approach described in Street, Carroll, and 
Ruppert (1988). Fourth, to further test the sensitivity of the results with respect to the modeling 
choice, we also estimate median least squares (least–absolute-value) regressions. The median 
least squares estimator minimizes the absolute deviations from the median and thus reduces the 
effect of outliers (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978). Standard errors are calculated in this case 
using the bootstrap method based on 1,000 replications. 
Table 5 summarizes the results from OLS regressions for the initial bid premium (models 1 to 5) 
and final ones (models 6 to 10). The regressions incorporate corporate governance and ownership 
attributes of the target, as well as variables corresponding to the nine regulatory regimes 

governing takeovers. The first regulatory regime was drop out from the regressions for avoiding 
multicoliniarity in the data. 
{Insert Table 5 about here} 
The results indicate that the level of acquisition premiums depend strongly on the highest price 
paid during the year preceding the bid. The effect of 52-week High is robust across various 
regulatory regimes and model specifications, corroborating the recent findings of Baker et al. 
(2009), Suzuki et Kruse (2010) and Betton et Eckbo (2013).  
Surprisingly, we find that the marginal variations in corporate governance regulations have a 
negative valuation effect compared to the benchmark regime. The effects become significantly 
stronger after the seventh regulatory regime. As, at that date, the controversy surrounding the 
buyout price metrics and delisting conditions had been engaged for a long time without any 
significant influence on the acquisition premiums (the coefficients of regulatory regimes 2 to 6 
are not statistically different from zero in some specifications), such an effect is likely to hint that 
the rule dictating the magnitude of the consideration involved in a mandatory bid does not add 
any value to minority shareholders. A similar argument could be evoked in the case of the 
reduction of the threshold triggering a mandatory bid at 33%, which was enacted into domestic 
regulation in 2004 without any apparent justification (regulatory regime 8). The point estimates, 
significant at 1% level, provide empirical support to the theoretical insight of Luh et al. (2001) 
arguing that changing the mandatory takeover thresholds has welfare implications on parties 
involved. However, the negative influence of regulatory regimes imposing stricter takeover 
conditions remains open to different interpretations. Bebchuk et al. (2010) argue that investors 
have become acquainted with the governance quality making disappear the governance-returns 
correlation. Consistent with learning hypothesis, the trading reflects fully the legal developments 
thus raising the overall level of market prices. Luh et al. (2001) posit that when the share price 
formation process is dependent on the mandatory takeover threshold there is a positive 
relationship between those thresholds and the bid premium. As the significant effect of the 
highest price persists in the cross section analysis of acquisition premiums, the negative 
coefficients of regulatory regimes should reflect influences beyond the patterns of returns. 
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Besides, other aspects connected with the quality of corporate governance at the target level, 
which structurally fall outside the MBR, have little power in explaining bid premiums. Financial 
dilution and ownership entrenchment proxies are not statistically significant. Our findings 
indicate that a better overall governance could be undermined by a general sentiment of 
overregulation.  
The direct and indirect toehold is negatively correlated with the acquisition premium. When we 
break down the direct toehold by category, this statistical relationship survives only for the bids 
made by acquirers controlling at the bid date more than 90% of the target equity (model 5). 
However, the significant negative coefficients of minority toeholds (0.0% < direct toehold < 
33.0%) and (33% @ direct toehold < 50.0%) in the specification accounting for the effect of 
indirect holdings (model 10) implies that acting in concert is a relevant feature of the bidding 
framework. It also suggest that when bids are structured for buying out minority shareholders by 
acting in concert with other investors instead of  disguising a pending deal with a substantial 
shareholder, bidding price is a poor investor protection mechanism.  
Once that the bid is in play, the acquisition premium increases in the presence of multiple 
bidders. The coefficient of the dummy variable "Rival" is positive and highly significant in all 
regressions. 
The median robust estimations replicate the main results reported in Table 5, showing that the 
influences are not driven by outliers. While the various toehold measures are no longer 
significant, differences in the type of acquirer explains variation in acquisition premiums. Thus, 
foreign companies and institutional investors pay for having the control, on average, more than 
individual investors. Even if the families play an important role in other blockholder regimes 
from continental Europe, the experience of private entrepreneurship is too tiny in emerging 
markets for supporting expensive acquisitions.  
{Insert Table 6 about here} 

We further address the concern that bidders could pay attention to the price solicited by the 
Government for its ownership in companies belonging to the same industrial sector. We 
reexamine whether previous statistical relationships remains valid after controlling the original 
effect of privatization for a sub-sample comprising all the bids organized between 1998 and 2004.  
The results in Table 7 show that parallel control transactions are influential in the acquisition 
pricing decision. This wealth effect adds up to the pricing triggered by the stock market. The 
higher the premium paid for AVAS block in the period preceding the bid, the higher the bid 
premium proposed to minority shareholders.  As on average the privatization premium is twice as 
high as the acquisition premium, this effect remains less powerful than a direct influence 
expected when the terms of "excepted transactions" would have been extended to all 
shareholders. 
{Insert Table 7 about here} 
Finally, in Table 8 we rerun the regressions of initial bid premiums against variables related to 
acquisition strategy of the bidder.  The sub-sample of observations covers only the offers made in 
the last two regulatory regimes making us neglect in the estimations the influence of legal 
provisions. The median regression coefficient estimates provide no evidence that the ownership - 
related variables result in higher takeover premiums. The acquirers that purchased a portion of 
their toehold before the bid do not pay a significantly lower premium than those with no market 
activity. While the quantities amassed on the market plays no significant role (the coefficient of 
short-term toehold is not significant), the influence of pre-bid strategy could be exerted over the 
market price. Indeed, the coefficient of the variable indicating the highest price was actually paid 
by the bidder itself is negative, while the effect of the 52-week High benchmark remains positive. 
Such a result make us infer that the presence of other insiders facilitate the bids and improve the 
ability of acquires to bargain for control before the tender offer is made to remaining 
shareholders. This result corroborates the findings of Gaspar et al. (2005) showing that the 
investors having a short investment horizon negatively impacts the target premiums. 
{Insert Table 8 about here} 

As far as the bids are not coercive, shareholders of the target are better placed to judge their 
merits. For explaining the bid outcome, we estimate Generalized Linear Models (GLM): 
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where the link function ,. is the logit function and the dependent variable is distributed as 
binomial.  
Our modeling choice is a better alternative to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions because 
the dependent variable (bid outcome) is a proportion that falls between zero and one. The various 
models are fit by using maximum likelihood (Newton–Raphson) optimization routines (see 
Dobson and Barnett, 2008, for a concise introduction and overview). For computational reasons, 
the bid outcome in the GLM models is expressed as coefficient comprised between zero and one 
and not as percentage.  
Among the factors with significant influence on the bid outcome we recognize some that are 
consistent with the empirical research regularities: the level of the final premium and the extant 
of bid revisions, which improve the perspective of a bid success and the existence of competing 
bidders, which make the bid failure more likely (Walkling, <;,	'0"*/ (D
( Bates et al., 2006). Compared with some existing contributions revealing the predictive 
ability of those determinants, we explain in the regressions presented in Table 9 the actual 
percentage tendered by remaining shareholders. Our definition of bid success is more accurate 
and highly relevant for the analyzed context where a bidder may buy even a single tendered share 
and structure a sequence of bids.   
The coefficient of the financial dilution is positive and significant but only when the effect of 
initial ownership of bidders is neglected. This result shows that minority shareholders prefer to 
quit poor-governed targets. The remaining shareholders facilitate the emergence of novel 
controllers and prefer tendering more to foreign companies which are less likely to be engaged in 

existing expropriation schemes. Besides, the target shareholders tender less shares to bidders that 
already possess stakes in the target and their marginal reluctance become greater for toeholds 
exceeding the legal control thresholds. 
The highest the difference between the bidding price and the highest market price reported during 
the relevant period, the higher the tender success. As in the bid premium regressions, the 
coefficient of that variable is positive and highly significant in all specifications. Even if the 
regulation enhances the protection of minority shareholders, we find that the legal improvements, 
especially those inspired by the European Takeover Directive, lead to poorer tender success. 
Conclusion 
In the European emerging economies, market authorities have been obviously concerned about 
the protection of minority shareholders' interests. However, our study shows that the evidence is 
not always in line with the well-intentioned beliefs subscribed by the regulators.  
The main conclusions about the effectiveness takeover regulation as governance mechanism are 
derived by analyzing the acquisition premium and the tender success of more than 90% of the 
takeovers organized in Romania between 1998 and 2012. The statistical significant negative 
effect of some regulatory regimes on the level of acquisition premium point to the fact that 
lowering the thresholds specifying the triggering events under the hard control level (50% of the 
voting rights) may compromise the minority shareholder protection objective. Besides, the 
transposition of public takeover regulation framed at the European Union level has been 
accompanied by a poor analysis of the domestic institutional structures, often beneficial to large 
shareholders. The specific conditions in which companies were privatized, the conduct of 
Government in its capacity as shareholder unveil that corporate diversity goes beyond the 
traditional classification of ownership structures with respect to the size of shareholdings or 
mechanisms separating cash-flow and voting rights. A deeper analysis of the peculiar legal 
provisions added into the national takeover regulations and the interactions among various forms 
of control transactions raise the question of whether the rationale of tailored exemptions is 
ultimately linked to the stated interest of the Takeover Directive. An important step in emerging 

markets where majority shareholders avoided any market scrutiny is to admit that conforming ex-
post to the takeover rules and standards would not render the control contestable. Our empirical 
findings related to the minority shareholder tender decision make us wondering whether the focus 
of takeover regulation on the price standards is not misplaced. The minority shareholders seem to 
take into account not only traditional market benchmarks but also various corporate governance 
features when they are facing takeover attempts. 
The protection is enhanced precisely when the unconstrained tender decisions are able to insulate 
minority shareholders from opportunistic incumbent blockholders acting as acquirers. The 
analysis of the practice in other European jurisdictions unfolds that some precautionary measures 
has never been addressed by the detailed rules in spite of the numerous amendments made to the 
Romanian takeover regulation. Several policy implications of such a comparison are 
straightforward. First, the introduction of a minimum acceptance in the case of voluntary and 
mandatory bid and the enforcement of "majority of minority condition" for closing a buyout 
would reduce the flexibility of large shareholders to structure creeping acquisitions. Second, 
more stringent anti creeper provisions should cover the usual market transactions by limiting 
further increases in acquirer's holdings within a specified time frame after the closing of a bid. 
Finally, the definition of post-bid top-up clauses could reduce the scope of ex-post bargaining 
with selected minority investors. According to such a restriction, an offeror, who buys additional 
securities on the market after the closing of the bid, must extend a market price higher than the 
acquisition price to all recipients of a previous public bid. Consequently, a key aspect of an 
adequate investor protection is to clarify and reveal the identity of those minority shareholders 
who accept the bid terms. Adding in the closing report, besides the final ownership of acquirer, 
information regarding the new ownership structure of the target, as well as details about the 
tendering decision of important minority shareholders would force large shareholders to 
internalize the countervailing effects of their discretionary behavior or misconduct. 
The scope of the extraction of private benefits in emerging markets point to a general feature of 
the corporate environment rather than to private abilities to divert resources. If this practice is not 
bidder specific, it makes little sense to promote the MBR in those economies on the ground that it 
prevents transfers to less efficient managers. Moreover, it is likely that the inconvenient of this 

rule (the decrease in the number of enhancing-value bids) outweighs its advocated advantage 
(impeding of value-decreasing bids). The dramatic contraction of stock markets must make the 
genuine phenomenon of corporate restructuring go hand in hand with a more important due 
diligence and a search for solutions preserving the channel of external financing. 
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Appendix 1A: Overview of regulatory regimes – Part I: January 1995 – August 2003 
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Appendix 2: Definition of variables 
Dependent variables   
Initial bid premium 
(pinitial−p−35)/p−35, where pinitial is the initial offer price and p−35 is the closing price on day 35  before the CNVM approves the takeover 
document 
Final bid premium 
(pfinal−p−35)/p−35, where pinitial is the final offer price and p−35  is the closing price on day 35 before the CNVM approves the takeover 
document 
Bid outcome  
the ratio of the number of tendered shares by the number of target shares that the acquirer wants to acquire according to the 
takeover document  
Independent variables  
Corporate governance attributes of the target 
Financial dilution  
1 - (100-d1)·(100-d2) …·(100-dk)/100
k
 where k is the number of equity changes before the bid date and dk is the financial dilution per 
equity change  
dk= (free float ex-postk - free float ex antek)*100/free float ex antek
Equity change the number of equity changes before the bid date 
Ownership attributes of the target 
Direct toehold  the stake in the target's equity owned by the acquirer at the bid date 
Indirect toehold  the stake in the target's equity owned by the acquirer and the persons acting in concert  with the acquirer at the bid date 
Zero toehold an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder owns no target share at the bid date and 0 otherwise. 
Direct toehold ∈ (0;33%) 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder has an initial positive stake lower than 33% of the target's equity capital 
and 0 otherwise. 
Direct toehold ∈ [33%;50%) 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder has an initial positive stake comprised between 33% and 50% of the 
target's equity capital and 0 otherwise. 
Direct toehold ∈ [50%;90%) 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder has an initial positive stake comprised between 50% and 90% of the 
target's equity capital and 0 otherwise. 
Direct toehold ∈ [90%;100%) 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder has an initial positive stake higher than 90% of the target's equity capital 
and 0 otherwise. 
Indirect toehold ∈ (0;33%) 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder and the persons acting in concert with the acquirer have an initial positive 
stake lower than 33% of the target's equity capital and 0 otherwise. 
Indirect toehold ∈ [33%;50%) 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder and the persons acting in concert with the acquirer have an initial positive 
stake comprised between 33% and 50% of the target's equity capital and 0 otherwise 
Indirect toehold ∈ [50%;90%) 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder and the persons acting in concert with the acquirer have an initial positive 
stake comprised between 50% and 90% of the target's equity capital and 0 otherwise 
Indirect toehold ∈ [90%;100%) 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder and the persons acting in concert with the acquirer have an initial positive 
stake higher than 90% of the target's equity capital and 0 otherwise 
AVAS foothold an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder bought a stake from the Privatization authority before the bid date 

Novel control 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder had less than 50% of target outstanding shares before the bid  and more 
than 50% of target outstanding shares afterwards 
Short-term toehold the ratio of the net purchase position of the bidder by the outstanding shares of target 
Other insiders 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the insiders, other than the bidder had a selling net position during the 12 months 
preceding the bid and 0 otherwise 
Offer variables   
Rival an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a rival offer was made before the closing date and 0 otherwise 
Bid jump the percentage change from the initial offer price to the final offer price 
Period revision an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bid period was extended at least once and 0 otherwise 
Stock Market, Control Benchmarks and Regulatory Environment 
52-week High the ratio of the bidding price and the highest market price during the 12 months preceding the bid 
Bidder paid 52-week High 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 52-week High is equal the highest price paid by the bidder during the 12 months 
preceding the bid 
Privatization premium benchmark the moving average of the privatization premiums clustered by industry and matched to each target based on the industrial sector 
Regulatory regimei  an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bid is approved within the regulatory regimei
Bidder characteristics   
Individual investor an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder is an individual investor and 0 otherwise 
Joint stock company an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder is a domestic joint stock company  and 0 otherwise 
Limited liability company an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder is a domestic limited liability company and 0 otherwise 
Foreign company an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder is a domestic limited liability foreign company and 0 otherwise 
Financial investor an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder is a financial invetsor and 0 otherwise 
Group an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the takeover is made by group of more than two bidders and 0 otherwise 
SIF 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder is one of the 5 Romanian private investment companies founded by 
political decision during the Mass privatization and 0 otherwise 

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Figure 1: Bid outcome kernel density estimate 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the main variables 
Variable name N Mean Std. dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Continuous variables        
Bid outcome (%) 1,814 36.34 35.54 0.00 1.72 24.89 69.67 100.00
Initial bid premium 1,733 124.09 237.73 –98.28 0.00 27.66 119.18 900.00
Final bid premium 1,733 180.54 329.79 –98.28 1.63 43.26 180.00 1,263.13
Tendered block 1,814 15.95 22.74 0.00 0.19 4.26 23.77 99.77
Bid jump 323 3.23 4.88 0.00 1.20 1.76 3.38 50.00
Bid length 1,854 27.62 18.27 0.00 20.00 21.00 30.00 324.00
52-week high 1,757 149.17 169.01 0.06 65.33 100.00 133.33 714.29
Privatization premium  
benchmark 1,853 356.49 247.03 –87.99 182.61 350.89 529.39 1,737.50
AVAS foothold 402 58.31 22.49 2.09 40.00 51.00 72.33 99.57
# equity changes 1,854 1.05 1.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 11.00
Financial dilution 1,854 –0.13 0.26 –1.00 –0.09 0.00 0.00 0.75
Dummy variables        
Price revision 1,854 17.00%       
Period extended 1,702 21.00%       
Bidder AVAS 1,854 12.00%       
Equity change 1,854 55.00%       
Rival 1,854 9.00%       
Individual investor 1,854 29.00%       
Joint stock company 1,854 20.00%       
Limited liability company 1,854 29.00%       
Foreign company 1,854 11.00%       
Financial investor 1,854 6.00%       
Group 1,854 2.00%       
SIF 1,854 3.00%       
Regulatory regime 1 1,854 47.00%       
Regulatory regime 2 1,854 3.00%       
Regulatory regime 3 1,854 1.00%       
Regulatory regime 4 1,854 0.01%       
Regulatory regime 5 1,854 2.00%       
Regulatory regime 6 1,854 7.00%       
Regulatory regime 7 1,854 16.00%       
Regulatory regime 8 1,854 7.00%       
Regulatory regime 9 1,854 3.00%       
Regulatory regime 10 1,854 14.00%             

 
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Table 2: Acquisition premiums and bid outcome by year 
Year N Mean St. dev. Min Q1 Median Q2 Max 
Panel A: Initial bid premium (%) 
1998 139 135.69 244.91 –97.97 16.28 38.46 135.29 900.00
1999 144 107.49 195.99 –88.00 0.00 33.33 118.13 900.00
2000 204 103.76 218.49 –96.00 –1.61 25.69 108.33 900.00
2001 257 126.67 241.15 –98.00 0.00 25.00 150.00 900.00
2002 165 89.46 185.19 –86.00 0.00 23.53 88.89 900.00
2003 220 123.19 238.38 –98.28 0.00 25.00 95.24 900.00
2004 252 197.68 308.60 –90.77 0.00 45.64 253.08 900.00
2005 69 125.50 252.42 –49.25 0.00 23.62 121.61 900.00
2006 68 93.30 188.85 –74.40 0.00 25.75 100.00 900.00
2007 67 87.18 164.52 –85.71 –0.00 8.82 154.03 658.06
2008 47 97.94 237.40 –36.87 0.00 11.02 66.67 900.00
2009 25 58.98 120.21 –79.63 0.00 20.00 63.33 535.14
2010 35 147.87 259.95 –36.28 2.38 20.34 131.28 900.00
2011 24 129.44 257.54 –77.32 1.95 29.39 145.80 900.00
2012 17 6.48 47.45 –56.00 –16.25 0.00 13.03 140.00
Total 1,733 124.09 237.73 –98.28 0.00 27.66 119.18 900.00
Panel B: Final bid premium (%) 
1998 139 154.72 294.04 –96.67 16.67 38.89 150.00 1,263.13
1999 144 139.37 260.92 –88.00 2.67 37.72 143.42 1,263.13
2000 204 198.58 347.39 –90.00 6.00 58.17 231.01 1,263.13
2001 257 206.21 354.82 –98.00 0.00 55.00 240.80 1,263.13
2002 165 171.14 310.07 –86.00 5.88 50.00 187.36 1,263.13
2003 220 169.44 312.95 –98.28 5.34 42.16 171.66 1,263.13
2004 252 262.42 402.01 –90.77 5.00 66.67 318.87 1,263.13
2005 69 189.77 360.67 –49.25 0.00 42.86 150.00 1,263.13
2006 68 126.13 276.37 –74.40 0.00 28.25 112.33 1,263.13
2007 67 119.31 244.40 –85.71 0.00 9.41 168.33 1,263.13
2008 47 116.02 301.17 –36.87 0.00 11.11 66.67 1,263.13
2009 25 61.86 125.30 –79.63 0.00 20.00 63.33 535.14
2010 35 158.29 295.63 –36.28 2.38 20.34 131.28 1,263.13
2011 24 159.70 354.26 –77.32 1.95 29.39 145.80 1,263.13
2012 17 6.48 47.45 –56.00 –16.25 0.00 13.03 140.00
Total 1,733 180.54 329.79 –98.28 1.63 43.26 180.00 1,263.13
Panel C: Bid outcome (%) 
1998 172 34.19 34.08 0.00 4.61 20.87 59.97 100.00
1999 153 47.42 36.50 0.00 16.43 41.07 85.84 100.00
2000 224 46.87 36.15 0.00 11.10 44.34 81.69 100.00
2001 274 43.49 36.53 0.00 5.57 40.94 78.28 100.00
2002 166 43.28 35.79 0.00 4.21 40.00 77.14 100.00
2003 227 37.62 35.45 0.00 2.51 26.33 71.70 100.00
2004 257 27.29 33.28 0.00 0.55 8.21 51.00 100.00
2005 65 25.70 31.91 0.00 0.52 8.93 43.45 100.00
2006 64 18.33 26.74 0.00 0.11 2.10 27.80 95.09
2007 65 24.60 35.00 0.00 0.00 3.26 40.00 100.00
2008 45 28.33 32.12 0.00 0.35 12.31 61.92 100.00
2009 26 19.52 28.62 0.00 1.02 8.58 22.84 93.63
2010 35 14.30 20.15 0.00 0.23 4.73 19.88 65.68
2011 24 26.80 25.91 0.09 4.33 18.17 46.77 87.45
2012 17 15.61 23.92 0.00 0.00 2.04 21.73 85.49
Total 1,814 36.34 35.54 0.00 1.72 24.89 69.67 100.00
  
 

Table 3: Acquisition premiums and bid outcome and by regulatory regime 
Regime N Mean St. dev. Min Q1 Median Q2 Max 
Panel A: Initial bid premium(%) 
Regime 1 786 114.71 222.91 –98.00 0.00 30.22 125.23 900.00
Regime 2 56 107.16 211.91 –34.48 6.67 28.31 89.29 900.00
Regime 3 22 112.83 210.41 0.00 4.48 35.58 70.00 900.00
Regime 4 2 29.81 19.13 16.28 16.28 29.81 43.33 43.33
Regime 5 30 79.68 192.77 –68.57 –12.50 13.78 100.00 900.00
Regime 6 123 96.05 201.12 –98.28 0.00 21.95 92.00 900.00
Regime 7 276 168.91 291.07 –90.77 0.00 29.34 172.79 900.00
Regime 8 125 205.37 304.22 –54.25 5.24 61.54 188.95 900.00
Regime 9 55 125.90 236.74 –38.42 4.00 31.00 140.00 900.00
Regime 10 258 88.88 194.28 –85.71 0.00 11.11 90.00 900.00
Total 1,733 124.09 237.73 –98.28 0.00 27.66 119.18 900.00
Panel B: Final premium (%) 
Regime 1 786 180.92 326.27 –98.00 4.17 50.00 194.10 1,263.13
Regime 2 56 150.04 292.10 0.00 7.70 47.10 145.00 1,263.13
Regime 3 22 206.60 364.95 –0.00 9.71 63.55 172.73 1,263.13
Regime 4 2 29.81 19.13 16.28 16.28 29.81 43.33 43.33
Regime 5 30 154.48 301.17 –68.57 –3.51 33.97 187.36 1,263.13
Regime 6 123 163.21 296.68 –98.28 2.27 42.01 180.00 1,263.13
Regime 7 276 222.45 371.70 –90.77 4.08 49.84 266.35 1,263.13
Regime 8 125 261.26 396.44 –54.25 9.76 72.41 291.67 1,263.13
Regime 9 55 192.18 352.77 –38.42 4.00 47.06 204.35 1,263.13
Regime 10 258 109.80 257.04 –85.71 0.00 11.65 92.31 1,263.13
Total 1,733 180.54 329.79 –98.28 1.63 43.26 180.00 1,263.13
Panel C: Bid outcome (%) 
Regime 1 870 43.24 36.07 0.00 7.43 37.84 78.14 100.00
Regime 2 60 41.26 37.92 0.00 1.72 31.62 81.29 100.00
Regime 3 21 40.96 34.63 0.00 4.68 34.76 71.00 93.53
Regime 4 2 49.06 67.64 1.23 1.23 49.06 96.90 96.90
Regime 5 26 43.05 37.19 0.00 1.03 39.31 75.55 100.00
Regime 6 120 45.30 34.83 0.00 12.66 41.83 80.31 100.00
Regime 7 287 29.75 34.09 0.00 0.92 11.99 54.91 100.00
Regime 8 123 24.72 32.27 0.00 0.44 6.22 40.83 100.00
Regime 9 53 21.68 28.62 0.00 0.35 2.85 38.14 92.74
Regime 10 252 22.16 29.57 0.00 0.13 6.47 37.21 100.00
Total 1,814 36.34 35.54 0.00 1.72 24.89 69.67 100.00
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Table 4: Bivariate comparison of initial bid premium, final bid premium, and bid outcome 
4.a.  Global   No toehold  Positive toehold  Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,696 125.58 27.92 327 148.69 28.05 1,369 120.06 27.91 1.95* 0.00 0.74 0.55 
Final premium 1,696 182.29 43.98 327 263.24 74.00 1,369 162.95 39.53 4.94*** 10.64*** 3.95*** 15.61*** 
Bid outcome 1,796 36.19 24.62 327 49.83 58.16 1,369 32.63 20.40 8.48*** 42.53*** 5.82*** 33.73*** 
4.b. Global   Toehold<50%  Toehold≥50%&<90% Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,076 98.11 25.00 698 85.01 25.00 378 122.31 25.00 –2.86*** 0.28 –1.7* 3.09* 
Final premium 1,076 143.63 36.36 698 128.38 33.33 378 171.78 40.59 –2.38** 0.46 –1.31 1.71 
Bid outcome 1,111 37.31 27.08 718 38.79 28.65 393 34.60 23.17 1.91* 2.01 1.68* 2.82* 
4.c. Global   Pre-existing control  Novel control  Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,248 131.69 26.79 911 138.92 30.00 337 112.14 20.00 1.69* 3.91** 2.18** 4.75** 
Final premium 1,248 188.03 42.86 911 181.86 42.31 337 204.72 47.14 –1.05 0.65 –0.67 0.44 
Bid outcome 1,306 42.17 36.02 927 30.56 17.86 379 70.56 76.70 –21.33*** 310.47*** –18.20*** 331.16***
4.d.  Global   Toehold≥90% Squeeze-out  Difference test 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 324 191.60 53.45 257 222.39 66.42 67 73.52 19.57 5.44*** 4.82** 3.08*** 9.44*** 
Final premium 324 222.86 55.87 257 260.03 66.67 67 80.30 19.57 5.28*** 4.82** 3.12*** 9.70*** 
Bid outcome 344 18.75 6.44 277 15.24 5.08 67 33.28 19.50 –5.40*** 5.36** –3.86*** 14.86*** 
4.e.  Global   No AVAS foothold  Positive AVAS foothold  Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,733 124.09 27.66 1,370 105.34 25.00 363 194.86 52.17 –6.45*** 16.69*** –5.64*** 31.77*** 
Final premium 1,733 180.54 43.26 1,370 161.30 38.89 363 253.16 69.00 –4.75*** 8.44*** –4.45*** 19.82*** 
Bid outcome 1,814 36.34 24.89  1,416 37.55 26.09  398 32.06 21.35  2.72*** 2.90* 1.55 2.38 
4.f. Global    AVAS foothold < 50%  AVAS foothold ≥ 50% Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,283 131.31 28.66 730 112.95 25.00 553 155.55 33.33 –3.10*** 1.46 –1.75* 3.05* 
Final premium 1,283 188.76 44.53 730 169.40 41.34 553 214.31 50.00 –2.34*** 1.46 –1.38 1.90 
Bid outcome 1,328 36.40 25.09  740 38.16 27.39  588 34.20 23.26  2.02** 1.22 2.05** 4.20** 
4.g. Global  Other AVAS insiders ≥ 50% Bidder AVAS ≥ 50% Difference test 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 553 155.55 33.33 352 111.74 23.57 201 232.25 66.66 –5.17*** 9.77*** –4.42*** 19.59*** 
Final premium 553 214.31 50.00 352 167.86 41.58 201 295.66 77.96 –4.01*** 8.04*** –4.01*** 16.05*** 
Bid outcome 588 34.19 23.25  363 37.68 27.08  225 28.56 17.95  3.12*** 3.80* 2.07** 4.31** 
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Table 4: Bivariate comparison of initial bid premium, final bid premium, and bid outcome (cont.) 
4.h.  Global   Short-term toehold  No short-term toehold  Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 275 96.58 14.71 81 38.20 6.20 194 120.95 21.74 –3.15*** 3.79* –2.80*** 7.86*** 
Final premium 275 119.84 16.28 81 38.20 6.20 194 153.93 25.50 –3.32*** 6.12** –3.16*** 9.93*** 
Bid outcome 268 21.75 5.80 81 19.71 4.83 187 22.63 5.99 –0.75 0.02 –0.55 0.30 
4.i. Global  No rival bid  Rival bid  Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,733 124.09 27.66 1,582 120.94 26.58 151 157.14 31.87 –1.79* 0.89 –1.58 2.49 
Final premium 1,733 180.54 43.26 1,582 169.23 39.53 151 299.04 120.00 –4.65*** 22.02*** –5.03*** 25.31*** 
Bid outcome 1,814 36.34 24.89 1,668 37.21 26.54 146 26.44 0.06 3.52*** 17.16*** 6.59*** 43.30*** 
4.j. Global   No price revision  Price revision  Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,733 124.09 27.66 1,446 128.79 30.00 287 100.46 20.00 1.85* 5.67* 2.27** 5.13** 
Final premium 1,733 180.54 43.26 1,446 145.14 30.00 287 358.88 184.00 –10.33*** 116.69*** –12.41*** 153.80*** 
Bid outcome 1,814 36.34 24.89 1,515 34.27 21.52 299 46.85 49.45 –5.64*** 30.31*** –4.35*** 18.87*** 
4.k.  Global   No period revision  Period revision  Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,601 124.41 25.00 1,262 132.92 28.21 339 92.72 19.83 2.75*** 4.53*** 1.75* 3.05* 
Final premium 1,601 183.87 42.86 1,262 180.48 38.89 339 196.49 63.93 –0.78 6.01** –2.91*** 8.57*** 
Bid outcome 1,664 36.47 25.42 1,330 36.09 23.83 334 37.97 31.41 –0.86 3.37* –0.20 0.04 
4.l. Global  No equity change  Equity change  Difference test 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-stat Chi2 z-stat K-W 
Initial premium 1,733 124.09 27.66 753 137.85 36.36 980 113.52 23.67 2.11** 10.68*** 3.39*** 11.51*** 
Final premium 1,733 180.54 43.26 753 209.21 59.09 980 158.51 32.17 3.18*** 11.98*** 4.63*** 21.47*** 
Bid outcome 1,814 36.34 24.89 827 39.87 29.95 987 33.38 19.50 3.89*** 13.18*** 3.97*** 15.72*** 
  

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Table 5: Acquisition premiums – Ordinary Last Squares (OLS) regressions 
Independent variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Initial premium  Final premium 
52-week High 1.203*** 1.204*** 1.197*** 1.199*** 1.203*** 1.457*** 1.465*** 1.434*** 1.445*** 1.442*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial dilution 6.446 5.898 7.288 7.177 3.779 28.245 26.446 30.350 28.368 25.958 
 (0.656) (0.682) (0.618) (0.624) (0.797) (0.245) (0.280) (0.215) (0.252) (0.291) 
Equity change –11.457 –10.960 –11.072 –10.303 –11.244 –17.297 –20.389 –15.971 –17.952 –16.801 
 (0.150) (0.175) (0.167) (0.207) (0.160) (0.195) (0.137) (0.234) (0.194) (0.209) 
Direct toehold –0.050  –0.049   –0.338*  –0.069   
 (0.639)  (0.738)   (0.071)  (0.778)   
Indirect toehold  –0.090  –0.107   –0.480**  –0.289  
 (0.405)  (0.445)   (0.010)  (0.232)  
Zero toehold   8.770 3.317    47.107*** 34.341*  
  (0.416) (0.757)    (0.009) (0.059)  
Direct toehold ∈(0;33%)     –13.409     –55.567*** 
    (0.188)     (0.001) 
Direct toehold ∈ [33%;50%)     –6.383     –50.002** 
    (0.598)     (0.015) 
Direct toehold ∈ [50%;90%)     1.577     –22.099 
    (0.890)     (0.258) 
Direct toehold ∈ [90%;100%)     –26.260**     –72.205*** 
    (0.048)     (0.002) 
AVAS foothold   8.047 5.707 6.505   11.198 9.738 7.419 
  (0.405) (0.553) (0.504)   (0.489) (0.550) (0.649) 
Rival      130.898*** 134.129*** 127.321*** 131.895*** 128.231*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulatory regime 2 –36.848** –36.148* –35.490** –34.807* –34.983* –69.606** –74.385** –75.747** –78.271** –76.725** 
 (0.040) (0.063) (0.049) (0.076) (0.071) (0.031) (0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.010) 
Regulatory regime 3 –25.634 –12.882 –27.071 –13.952 –25.990 –7.014 7.611 –12.168 3.442 –10.070 
 (0.408) (0.689) (0.384) (0.666) (0.402) (0.893) (0.889) (0.815) (0.950) (0.846) 
Regulatory regime 4 5.326 5.491 3.161 8.581 –0.198 –18.346 –19.663 –5.539 –2.033 –12.688 
 (0.956) (0.954) (0.974) (0.929) (0.998) (0.910) (0.903) (0.973) (0.990) (0.938) 
Regulatory regime 5 –10.885 –9.952 –13.945 –13.058 –10.465 –1.244 –0.473 –8.242 –6.909 –1.263 
 (0.680) (0.702) (0.599) (0.619) (0.693) (0.978) (0.991) (0.853) (0.877) (0.977) 
Regulatory regime 6 –30.367** –28.403** –28.740** –26.701** –26.589** –22.705 –18.099 –20.247 –15.300 –17.182 
 (0.026) (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) (0.053) (0.323) (0.436) (0.378) (0.512) (0.455) 
Regulatory regime 7 –36.898*** –34.517*** –35.910*** –34.158*** –30.267*** –65.214*** –61.704*** –67.468*** –63.510*** –59.265*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Regulatory regime 8 –51.906*** –53.220*** –50.246*** –52.624*** –47.510*** –79.734*** –79.828*** –81.349*** –81.346*** –77.881*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Regulatory regime 9 –32.397** –28.815* –27.983* –26.025 –30.053* –24.398 –16.686 –22.941 –16.456 –28.121 
 (0.045) (0.078) (0.097) (0.190) (0.076) (0.459) (0.615) (0.490) (0.624) (0.396) 
Regulatory regime 10 –17.429* –15.253 –12.048 –12.000 –14.032 –43.846*** –37.570** –41.403** –37.280* –46.973** 
 (0.085) (0.162) (0.291) (0.301) (0.220) (0.007) (0.029) (0.025) (0.057) (0.010) 
Joint stock company   5.135 6.626 3.983   –9.326 –6.365 –12.128 
  (0.604) (0.514) (0.687)   (0.574) (0.711) (0.464) 
Limited liability company   13.404 14.524 11.492   30.449** 30.172* 26.458* 
  (0.140) (0.115) (0.207)   (0.045) (0.053) (0.082) 
Foreign company   2.599 2.642 2.269   –16.011 –14.712 –18.176 
  (0.830) (0.827) (0.851)   (0.430) (0.473) (0.370) 
Financial investor   13.206 –0.242 11.239   5.239 –8.004 1.204 
  (0.359) (0.988) (0.435)   (0.828) (0.761) (0.960) 
Group   –18.370 –18.464 –18.308   21.539 21.133 20.409 
  (0.471) (0.464) (0.472)   (0.614) (0.621) (0.632) 
SIF     –4.037 –6.104 –4.951      –37.890* –41.808* –39.183* 
  (0.852) (0.776) (0.820)   (0.083) (0.061) (0.080) 
N 1,696 1,592 1,696 1,586 1,696 1,696 1,592 1,696 1,586 1,696 
R2 0.679 0.693 0.680 0.694 0.681 0.529 0.543 0.534 0.547 0.536 
Adjusted R2 0.676 0.690 0.676 0.690 0.677 0.525 0.539 0.528 0.541 0.529 
F-stat 309.3*** 306.6*** 191.8*** 192.8*** 175.0*** 111.9*** 111.9*** 70.7*** 71.1*** 65.4*** 
H0: Regimes jointly zero 3.852*** 3.721*** 3.285*** 3.353*** 2.790*** 2.629*** 2.392** 2.492*** 2.398** 2.218** 
H0: Regimes same effect 2.121** 2.456** 1.806* 2.286** 1.471  1.711* 1.807* 1.557 1.866* 1.273 
Note: dependent variables (initial and final bid premiums) are winsorized at the 95% level; robust standard errors are computed using the Huber-White sandwich estimators; constant 
included but not reported 

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Table 6: Acquisition premiums – robust (median) regressions 
Independent variable 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10 
Initial premium  Final premium 
52-week High 1.101*** 1.122*** 1.110*** 1.121*** 1.107*** 1.209*** 1.226*** 1.197*** 1.214*** 1.207*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial dilution 1.600 2.528 1.367 2.542 –1.459 3.159 5.266 4.077 3.988 0.318 
 (0.788) (0.687) (0.826) (0.708) (0.810) (0.647) (0.443) (0.623) (0.627) (0.965) 
Equity change 1.701 0.925 0.312 –0.850 1.138 –1.645 –6.138 –2.691 –6.456 –4.154 
 (0.709) (0.844) (0.936) (0.834) (0.776) (0.763) (0.326) (0.638) (0.302) (0.468) 
Direct toehold –0.000  –0.108   –0.147**  –0.131*   
 (0.998)  (0.118)   (0.028)  (0.095)   
Indirect toehold  0.033  –0.047   –0.101  –0.113  
 (0.538)  (0.469)   (0.209)  (0.186)  
Zero toehold   –9.921* –4.970    0.239 2.854  
  (0.066) (0.324)    (0.978) (0.742)  
Direct toehold ∈(0;33%)     6.762     –3.612 
    (0.189)     (0.651) 
Direct toehold ∈ [33%;50%)     3.655     –5.513 
    (0.503)     (0.526) 
Direct toehold ∈ [50%;90%)     9.307     2.001 
    (0.118)     (0.821) 
Direct toehold ∈ [90%;100%)     –2.940     –17.334** 
    (0.577)     (0.033) 
AVAS foothold   –7.845* –6.587 –5.933   –3.999 –5.630 –2.634 
  (0.095) (0.190) (0.198)   (0.506) (0.328) (0.639) 
Rival      48.050** 44.953* 46.009** 42.678 48.074** 
     (0.017) (0.079) (0.042) (0.118) (0.029) 
Regulatory regime 2 –21.979* –30.692** –15.008 –21.620* –17.867 –29.483* –34.153* –24.990 –28.090 –30.866 
 (0.091) (0.031) (0.225) (0.077) (0.170) (0.098) (0.061) (0.205) (0.125) (0.122) 
Regulatory regime 3 4.457 5.524 4.249 6.864 4.527 27.365 26.894 25.509 22.546 23.664 
 (0.865) (0.852) (0.874) (0.822) (0.872) (0.383) (0.361) (0.444) (0.469) (0.561) 
Regulatory regime 4 62.243** 63.659** 5.727 5.881 –6.314 49.872** 51.546** –0.716 0.565 48.636 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.834) (0.831) (0.836) (0.046) (0.044) (0.978) (0.984) (0.110) 
Regulatory regime 5 –15.108 –15.790 –4.517 –9.811 –5.601 0.216 1.496 10.135 7.243 –1.725 
 (0.231) (0.261) (0.753) (0.524) (0.717) (0.992) (0.940) (0.618) (0.756) (0.942) 
Regulatory regime 6 –16.981*** –17.213*** –12.024* –15.258** –12.326* –20.984** –21.809** –20.406** –19.015** –20.370** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.076) (0.032) (0.058) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.044) (0.015) 
Regulatory regime 7 –33.707*** –33.964*** –25.069*** –27.789*** –25.914*** –42.757*** –42.351*** –38.253*** –39.274*** –37.085*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 

Regulatory regime 8 –29.822*** –33.238*** –22.788*** –25.344*** –23.378*** –47.794*** –50.023*** –40.883*** –42.963*** –40.182*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulatory regime 9 –17.206** –18.010** –8.620 –8.136 –14.047* –31.758*** –29.731** –21.550* –19.592 –25.702** 
 (0.049) (0.034) (0.352) (0.427) (0.094) (0.005) (0.013) (0.097) (0.153) (0.048) 
Regulatory regime 10 –19.293*** –21.365*** –11.232* –13.685** –14.334** –26.483*** –27.880*** –27.115*** –28.103*** –28.320*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.059) (0.028) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Joint stock company   8.518* 9.090* 5.902   6.108 6.617 6.678 
  (0.082) (0.071) (0.228)   (0.316) (0.294) (0.266) 
Limited liability company   8.097 7.422 6.259   14.078* 13.652 16.023** 
  (0.116) (0.154) (0.196)   (0.088) (0.118) (0.039) 
Foreign company   17.480*** 16.654*** 13.381**   13.619* 12.658 13.719* 
  (0.002) (0.009) (0.021)   (0.069) (0.101) (0.053) 
Financial investor   24.622*** 22.412*** 24.434***   16.794** 15.586* 16.383** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.033) (0.085) (0.041) 
Group   –3.079 0.988 –0.788   –1.701 1.117 1.816 
  (0.759) (0.916) (0.927)   (0.921) (0.951) (0.904) 
SIF   14.239 14.201 12.829   15.330 13.477 16.091 
  (0.227) (0.174) (0.250)   (0.334) (0.354) (0.301) 
N 1,696 1,592 1,696 1,586 1,696 1,696 1,592 1,696 1,586 1,696 
Sum of absolute deviations 301,663.9 287,993.2 300,700.4 286,967.7 300,569.7 391,966.4 376,326.8 391,600.0 375,464.6 391,229.4 
Sum of raw deviations 406,242.2 389,710.6 406,242.2 389,503.9 406,242.2 499,076.7 481,116.1 499,076.7 480,614.4 499,076.7 
Pseudo-R2 0.257 0.261 0.260 0.263 0.260 0.215 0.218 0.215 0.219 0.216 
H0: Regimes jointly zero 6.585*** 6.518*** 3.959*** 4.382*** 3.447*** 9.283*** 7.592*** 4.487*** 4.333*** 4.543*** 
H0: Regimes same effect 3.449*** 3.431*** 1.900* 1.956** 1.488 4.849*** 4.346*** 2.092** 2.280** 2.180** 
 Note: the median regression coefficient estimates are based on bootstrap standard errors computed using 1,000 replications; the reported pseudo-R2 is calculated as 1 – [sum of the 
weighted deviations about estimated median / sum of weighted deviations about raw median]; constant included but not reported 
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Table 7: Privatization premium benchmark and initial bid premium (1998--2004 sub-sample) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Privatization premium benchmark 0.039** 0.034* 0.042** 0.033** 0.037** 0.029** 
(0.050) (0.065) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.043) 
52-week High 1.049*** 1.066*** 1.066*** 1.092*** 1.083*** 1.090*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial dilution 1.401 2.063 3.624 1.652 1.939 –0.300 
(0.873) (0.798) (0.650) (0.845) (0.798) (0.968) 
Equity change 3.887 2.430 3.941 1.293 1.464 –0.412 
(0.502) (0.631) (0.346) (0.783) (0.772) (0.932) 
Direct toehold 0.014  –0.068    
(0.837)  (0.389)    
Indirect toehold  0.030  –0.091   
 (0.611)  (0.248)   
Zero toehold   –5.419 –3.944   
  (0.358) (0.421)   
Direct toehold ∈(0;33%)     1.964  
    (0.735)  
Direct toehold ∈ [33%;50%)     0.248  
    (0.972)  
Direct toehold ∈ [50%;90%)     7.507  
    (0.316)  
Direct toehold ∈ [90%;100%)     –7.918  
    (0.189)  
Indirect toehold ∈ (0;33%)      0.131 
     (0.983) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [33%;50%)      –5.140 
     (0.447) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [50%;90%)      7.580 
     (0.274) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [90%;100%)      –9.336* 
     (0.091) 
AVAS foothold   –9.087 –11.724** –8.162 –6.725 
  (0.104) (0.027) (0.116) (0.161) 
Regulatory regime 2 –25.101* –25.063* –14.790 –13.598 –14.133 –13.300 
(0.075) (0.079) (0.161) (0.211) (0.208) (0.305) 
Regulatory regime 3 7.364 30.024 17.395 20.065 11.593 24.835 
(0.794) (0.261) (0.472) (0.460) (0.692) (0.437) 
Regulatory regime 4 68.903** 69.510** 56.213** 54.842** 62.103** 61.360* 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.045) (0.046) (0.051) 
Regulatory regime 5 –11.110 –11.037 0.855 0.063 1.740 –2.525 
(0.489) (0.454) (0.960) (0.997) (0.924) (0.852) 
Regulatory regime 6 –14.547** –14.750** –10.808 –10.340 –8.153 –8.269 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.134) (0.169) (0.248) (0.173) 
Regulatory regime 7 –31.497*** –31.437*** –21.826*** –21.499*** –20.022*** –19.457*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Regulatory regime 8 –27.269*** –29.795*** –16.206* –21.200** –14.686 –17.814** 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.087) (0.027) (0.175) (0.045) 
Joint stock company   11.333** 18.681*** 13.705** 19.409*** 
  (0.035) (0.004) (0.023) (0.001) 
Limited liability company   13.389** 19.101*** 12.564** 16.645** 
  (0.041) (0.007) (0.036) (0.017) 
Foreign company   26.427*** 29.837*** 24.007*** 26.589*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial investor   27.740*** 29.395*** 26.952*** 30.104*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Group   10.748 9.812 4.172 6.586 
  (0.588) (0.540) (0.818) (0.553) 
SIF     16.566 19.234* 20.746** 22.918** 
  (0.237) (0.070) (0.033) (0.043) 
N 1,355 1,256 1,355 1,251 1,355 1,256 
Sum of absolute deviations 99,357.5 92,099.4 98,106.7 90,637.9 97,927.5 90,594.0 
Sum of raw deviations 186,349.4 176,416.9 186,349.4 176,297.4 186,349.4 176,416.9 
Pseudo-R2 0.467 0.478 0.474 0.486 0.474 0.486 
H0: Regimes jointly zero 6.071*** 5.830*** 3.997*** 5.269*** 2.853*** 2.745*** 

H0: Regimes same effect 3.647*** 4.362*** 2.721** 2.292** 1.860* 2.150** 
Note: the median regression coefficient estimates reported in this table are based on bootstrap standard errors computed 
using 1,000 replications; the reported pseudo-R2 is calculated as 1 – [sum of the weighted deviations about estimated 
median / sum of weighted deviations about raw median]; constant included but not reported  
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Table 8: Bidder paid 52-week high, short-term toehold, insiders, and initial bid premium (2006--2012 sub-sample) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bidder paid 52-week High –23.402*** –26.448*** –24.393 –24.719*** –23.262 –23.928*** 
(0.008) (0.002) (0.294) (0.005) (0.270) (0.010) 
Short-term toehold –0.024 –0.086 –0.108 –0.094 –0.114 –0.096 
(0.911) (0.642) (0.670) (0.666) (0.589) (0.621) 
Other insiders 2.160 4.092 4.018 6.178 4.497 1.896 
(0.809) (0.602) (0.615) (0.476) (0.590) (0.804) 
52-week High 1.029*** 1.035*** 1.008*** 1.014*** 1.012*** 1.006*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial dilution –3.510 1.472 –6.412 –3.406 –6.876 –6.073 
(0.773) (0.879) (0.585) (0.774) (0.619) (0.650) 
Equity change 0.298 –0.373 4.295 –4.849 7.828 1.197 
(0.971) (0.969) (0.727) (0.684) (0.490) (0.904) 
Direct toehold 0.013  –0.041    
(0.895)  (0.792)    
Indirect toehold  0.138  0.204   
 (0.301)  (0.202)   
Zero toehold   –17.251 1.512   
  (0.617) (0.978)   
Direct toehold ∈(0;33%)     8.422  
    (0.788)  
Direct toehold ∈ [33%;50%)     28.339  
    (0.388)  
Direct toehold ∈ [50%;90%)     12.833  
    (0.693)  
Direct toehold ∈ [90%;100%)     12.855  
    (0.692)  
Indirect toehold ∈ (0;33%)      –8.392 
     (0.923) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [33%;50%)      24.234 
     (0.782) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [50%;90%)      16.246 
     (0.853) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [90%;100%)      17.263 
     (0.845) 
AVAS foothold   –5.873 –8.909 –5.302 –4.594 
  (0.756) (0.655) (0.664) (0.819) 
Joint stock company   –5.377 –12.955 –4.573 –9.419 
  (0.672) (0.310) (0.708) (0.397) 
Limited liability company   –8.655 –15.919 –7.729 –14.929 
  (0.359) (0.102) (0.426) (0.105) 
Foreign company   –15.911* –21.194** –15.191 –21.435* 
  (0.072) (0.042) (0.137) (0.051) 
Financial investor   –16.685 –12.615 –7.681 –25.757
  (0.361) (0.472) (0.699) (0.242) 
Group   –26.779 –15.063 –17.583 –5.354 
  (0.213) (0.413) (0.355) (0.771) 
SIF   9.297 –2.354 15.446 6.162 
  (0.762) (0.929) (0.546) (0.820) 
N 277 273 277 273 277 273 
Sum of absolute deviations 17,088.2 16,919.9 16,874.6 16,722.8 16,798.9 16,582.4 
Sum of raw deviations 28,405.9 27,852.0 28,405.9 27,852.0 28,405.9 27,852.0 
Pseudo-R2 0.398 0.393 0.406 0.400 0.409 0.405 
Note: the median regression coefficient estimates reported in this table are based on bootstrap standard errors computed 
using 1,000 replications; the reported pseudo-R2 is calculated as 1 – [sum of the weighted deviations about estimated 
median / sum of weighted deviations about raw median]; constant included but not reported 

Table 9: Bid outcome – Generalized Linear Model (GLM) regressions 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Final premium 0.023** 0.029*** 0.024***     
 (0.046) (0.010) (0.002)     
Direct toehold    –1.265***    
   (0.000)    
Indirect toehold      –1.266***  
     (0.000)  
Direct toehold ∈(0;33%)     –0.284**   
    (0.013)   
Direct toehold ∈ [33%;50%)     –0.409***   
    (0.002)   
Direct toehold ∈ [50%;90%)     –0.576***   
    (0.000)   
Direct toehold ∈ [90%;100%]     –1.777***   
    (0.000)   
Indirect toehold ∈ (0;33%)       –0.194 
      (0.142) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [33%;50%)       –0.281* 
      (0.055) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [50%;90%)       –0.420*** 
      (0.001) 
Indirect toehold ∈ [90%;100%)       –1.813*** 
      (0.000) 
Novel control   1.428***     
  (0.000)     
52-week High    0.043*** 0.056*** 0.041** 0.059*** 
   (0.009) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) 
Price revision 0.720*** 0.585*** 0.538*** 0.443*** 0.394*** 0.375*** 0.309*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) 
Period extended 0.059 0.035 0.269* –0.087 –0.107 –0.067 –0.100 
 (0.635) (0.789) (0.063) (0.518) (0.420) (0.623) (0.458) 
Rival –0.991*** –0.926*** 0.324 –1.135*** –1.121*** –1.226*** –1.178*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.891) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial dilution 0.480*** 0.373** 0.139 0.009 –0.130 0.012 –0.192 
 (0.001) (0.020) (0.889) (0.952) (0.426) (0.939) (0.250) 
Regulatory regime 2  –0.050 –0.227 0.029 0.048 –0.065 0.010 
 (0.817) (0.976) (0.890) (0.825) (0.769) (0.965) 
Regulatory regime 3  –0.066 –0.137** –0.285 –0.260 –0.251 –0.283 
 (0.847) (0.022) (0.429) (0.450) (0.562) (0.473) 
Regulatory regime 4  0.331 –0.312 0.345 0.203 0.180 0.048 
 (0.779) (0.992) (0.733) (0.850) (0.862) (0.965) 
Regulatory regime 5  0.019 –0.303 0.100 0.211 0.143 0.347 
 (0.948) (0.180) (0.695) (0.400) (0.578) (0.170) 
Regulatory regime 6  0.214 0.072** 0.291** 0.362** 0.279* 0.391*** 
 (0.130) (0.030) (0.041) (0.012) (0.051) (0.007) 
Regulatory regime 7  –0.394*** –0.497*** –0.161 0.028 –0.223* 0.095 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.180) (0.823) (0.070) (0.468) 
Regulatory regime 8  –0.635*** –0.871** –0.388** –0.314* –0.405** –0.202 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.024) (0.063) (0.024) (0.254) 
Regulatory regime 9  –0.940*** –0.785*** –0.794*** –0.849*** –0.782*** –0.876*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
Regulatory regime 10  –0.810*** –0.538*** –0.542*** –0.597*** –0.526*** –0.542*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Joint stock company  0.058 0.008 0.216* 0.185 0.171 0.133 
 (0.611) (0.248) (0.061) (0.107) (0.149) (0.260) 
Limited liability company  0.118 0.083 0.302*** 0.249** 0.198* 0.151 
 (0.239) (0.489) (0.003) (0.015) (0.059) (0.151) 
Foreign company  0.562*** 0.366*** 0.786*** 0.809*** 0.727*** 0.769*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial investor  0.080 0.108 0.160 0.120 0.182 0.061 
 (0.598) (0.286) (0.301) (0.426) (0.289) (0.712) 
Group  0.146 0.114 0.300 0.298 0.256 0.234 
 (0.618) (0.541) (0.305) (0.321) (0.388) (0.451) 
SIF  0.184 0.202 0.491* 0.489* 0.355 0.319 
 (0.512) (0.950) (0.085) (0.097) (0.212) (0.283) 

Constant –0.647*** –0.451*** –0.554*** –0.291*** –0.311** –0.113 –0.263* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.275) (0.057) 
N 1,693 1,693 1,208 1,706 1,706 1,602 1,602 
Log-likelihood –901.668 –876.017 –581.592 –863.595 –853.280 –811.340 –794.480 
Chi2 82.2*** 193.6*** 451.9*** 270.5*** 335.8*** 277.5*** 367.1*** 
AIC 1,815.3 1,794.0 1,207.1 1,771.1 1,756.5 1,666.6 1,638.9 
BIC 1,847.9 1,908.1 1,319.3 1,890.9 1,892.6 1,785.0 1,773.4 
Dispersion (scaled) 0.619 0.594 0.474 0.573 0.562 0.576 0.555 
Pearson dispersion 0.529 0.518 0.427 0.507 0.494 0.505 0.486 
H0: Regimes jointly zero – 72.304*** 47.959*** 38.626*** 46.915*** 36.260*** 44.655*** 
H0: Regimes same effect – 49.148*** 23.376*** 32.976*** 43.289*** 30.642*** 43.368*** 
Note: GLM parameterization – distribution family = binomial; link function = logit  
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